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Abstract
Maximizing utility with a budget constraint is the primary
goal for advertisers in real-time bidding (RTB) systems.
The policy maximizing the utility is referred to as the
optimal bidding strategy. Earlier works on optimal bidding
strategy apply model-based batch reinforcement learning
methods which can not generalize to unknown budget and
time constraint. Further, the advertiser observes a censored
market price which makes direct evaluation infeasible on
batch test datasets. Previous works ignore the losing
auctions to alleviate the difficulty with censored states; thus
significantly modifying the test distribution. We address the
challenge of lacking a clear evaluation procedure as well as
the error propagated through batch reinforcement learning
methods in RTB systems. We exploit two conditional
independence structures in the sequential bidding process
that allow us to propose a novel practical framework using
the maximum entropy principle to imitate the behavior of
the true distribution observed in real-time traffic. Moreover,
the framework allows us to train a model that can generalize
to the unseen budget conditions than limit only to those
observed in history. We compare our methods on two real-
world RTB datasets with several baselines and demonstrate
significantly improved performance under various budget
settings.
1 Introduction
Real-time bidding (RTB) has become the dominant
mechanism for online advertising in current times. One
of the key challenges for the advertiser in the RTB
system is to devise a sequential bidding strategy for
bid requests to maximize some utility (e.g., impression,
clicks, etc.) under some budget constraint. Under
repeated auctions with budget constraints, bidding the
true value is not the optimal action in second-price
auctions. We refer to the policy maximizing expected
utility under a budget constraint as the optimal bidding
strategy.
In recent times, reinforcement learning (RL)
achieves almost human-level performance in many
games and control problems [19]. Reinforcement learn-
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ing to bid (RLB), a model-based RL approach for opti-
mal bidding in RTB has been proposed recently [5]. Al-
though RLB improves upon existing methods, RLB suf-
fers from scalability and efficiency issues in RTB systems
using a misspecified model learned from inadequate in-
teractions. A better alternative is to use a model-free
RL algorithm which requires a large number of inter-
actions with the environment (users, other participants
in RTB) to learn the optimal strategy. However, in
real-time bidding systems, learning the optimal bidding
strategy is often a batch process with limited opportu-
nity to interact with the environment. From historical
interactions, the advertiser needs to learn the optimal
action (bidding price). In reinforcement learning litera-
ture, learning optimal policy from historical interactions
without exploration is often termed as batch reinforce-
ment learning [16].
Although model-free online RL algorithms are con-
ceptually appealing, real-time bidding systems often
have the choice of batch reinforcement learning. Most
early approaches of optimal bidding strategy can be
classified as some form of batch RL [5, 2, 27, 20]. How-
ever, the single drawback of any batch RL algorithm
is the limited generalization ability to new state space
due to extrapolation error as shown lately in [8]. With-
out exploration, often it is not feasible to extrapolate
under new budget constraints. Besides, a clear eval-
uation procedure is lacking in the literature of online
advertising due to the nature of the batch data. With-
out interacting with the environment, it is not viable
to evaluate reward for any action other than the one
taken in the test batch dataset. Further, in the con-
text of RTB, the behavior of the market is censored
when the advertiser loses an auction; hence the adver-
tiser often observes censored states which form the test
dataset. Early methods of optimal bidding strategy re-
move the censored/unobserved part of the test dataset
for evaluation leading to a different distribution than ob-
served in real-time environments. The dataset shift in
the true distribution and the truncated train-test distri-
bution adopted in previous research makes such models
unsuitable for directly applying to the real-world traffic.
The batch framework is particularly important as
the dataset is usually collected from an (unknown) off-
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policy strategy in the RTB system. Further, conducting
real-traffic A/B testing is not often feasible and cost-
effective in practice. We address the deficiencies in the
batch RL methods such as lack of a clear evaluation
procedure as well as the error propagation through the
training methods in RTB systems. Using two condi-
tional independence structures in the sequential bid-
ding process, we propose a novel framework applying
the maximum entropy principle to imitate the behav-
ior of the true distribution observed in real-time traf-
fic. The simulated environment allows accurate eval-
uation of any model in the RTB system without the
dataset shift. Further, the framework enables train-
ing any model-free RL algorithm that can generalize
to an unseen budget and time constraints, beyond the
states observed in historical interactions. We compare
our methods on real-world public RTB data-sets with
several baselines and show that our framework signifi-
cantly improves generalization performance under vari-
ous budget settings.
2 Background and Related Work
Reinforcement Learning. A Markov Decision
Process (MDP) M is represented as a tuple
(S,A, T ,R, γ) which consists of a set of states s ∈ S, a
set of actions a ∈ A, a transition function T (s, a, s′) =
P(si+1 = s
′|si = s, ai = a), a reward function R(s, a),
and, a discount parameter γ [22]. si, ai, ri are the state,
action, and, reward at time step i respectively. A policy
is defined as π : S × A → [0, 1] representing the condi-
tional distribution over actions given the state that the
agent follows. The goal of the agent is to find the policy
π that maximizes the expected discounted reward over
the episode [22]. State-Action value function is the ex-
pected reward that can be obtained following policy π
starting from a state-action pair (s, a) ∈ S ×A:
Qpi(s, a) = E[
∞∑
τ=t
γτ−trτ |st = s, at = a, π]
The optimal value function for the state-action pair,
Q∗(s, a) = maxpi Q
pi(s, a), satisfies the Bellman
Optimality equation [22], Q∗(s, a) = E[R(s, a) +
γ
∑
s′ T (s, a, s′)maxa′ Q∗(s′, a′)]. Similarly, value func-
tion from a state s ∈ S is the expected reward from that
state following policy π, V pi(s) = Ea∼piQ
pi(s, a).
Batch reinforcement learning. In batch RL, the
agent does not have opportunities to interact with the
environment [16]. If the policy used to collect the
experiences is known, we can use the deep Q-network
(DQN) with importance sampling (IS) to learn from the
batch experiences (dataset) [19]. However, DQN with
IS suffers from high extrapolation error [8]. Further, in
an RTB system, the policy that gathered the historical
data is usually unknown. A general approach to learn
from batch data is to learn fitted Q-iteration (possibly
with a deep network) [21, 3]. Nevertheless, without
exploration, the performance of neural fitted Q iteration
is limited to the experiences gathered.
Real-time Bidding. In RTB systems, ad display
opportunities are traded using second-price auctions in
real-time from the publishers (sellers) to the advertis-
ers (buyers) through the ad-exchange. When a user
visits a publisher’s page, the supply-side platform, act-
ing on behalf of the publisher, requests the ad-exchange
for advertisements to fill up the vacant slots. The
ad-exchange, in turn, announces the request to the
demand-side platforms (DSP) who represent the adver-
tisers. Subsequent to getting a bid request, DSP chooses
one among several ads to bid and participates in the auc-
tion. The ad exchange picks the highest bidder and the
winning DSP pays the second price (or market price).
DSP observes the market price if it wins the auction;
otherwise, in case of losing the auction, only the lower
bound on the market price is known. This mixture of
observed and partially observed data is known as cen-
sored data. The purpose of DSP is to maximize some
utility (impression, click, or, conversion) under some
budget and time constraint for each of its advertisers.
In the rest of the paper, we use the term advertiser and
DSP interchangeably for simplicity.
We represent a bid request as x, market price as w
(can be unknown), budget left as b, and, time left as t.
Advertiser bids a for the bid request x with cost c (w
when the advertiser wins the auction and 0 otherwise).
The advertiser observes a utility reward r (impression,
click, or, conversion). The objective of the advertiser is
to maximize the total reward obtained given the budget
and time constraint with a policy π([x,b, t], ·):
max
a∼pi
t∑
1
Ex[r|x], such that
t∑
1
Ex[c|a,x] ≤ b.
Optimal Bidding Strategy. To compute the op-
timal bidding strategy, the advertiser needs to estimate
the expected utility and the expected cost. Previous
research extensively studied utility estimation problems
(such as click-through rate estimation) [18] and the bid
landscape forecasting problem for computing expected
cost [26, 9]. In real-world applications, due to simplic-
ity and scalability, the bidding systems usually employ a
simple linear bidding strategy [20] where the advertiser
bids proportional to their expected value (utility). Early
attempts for optimal bidding strategy include model-
based MDP and partially observable MDP formulations
[2, 27] which works in the context of sponsored ads. In
[5], the authors proposed the RLB model to solve the
Bellman equation on a simplified model. Solving the
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Bellman equation has an attractive property of com-
puting the optimal strategy when the model is correct.
However, to tackle large continuous state and action
space, the RLB model assumes the market price and
the winning rate are independent of the bid requests.
Moreover, inferring the optimal action has O(k) time
complexity andO(T 2k) memory complexity for each bid
request (T, k is the maximum number of time steps left
and the number of bid price respectively). This is unac-
ceptable in the real world situation. RLB proposed to
use a segmented time window with neural network ap-
proximation leading to further approximation besides
the model simplification. Besides, model-based batch
reinforcement learning algorithms do not have the op-
portunity to explore with the real environment making
them prone to extrapolation errors [8].
In this paper, we frame the problem as learning
the optimal policy from batch datasets (with censored
states) without the choice of explorations and access
to the policy used to collect the dataset. The second
problem we consider is to learn a correct evaluation
procedure from such offline datasets with censored
states. Note that, for losing an auction, we only
have a lower bound on the market price; consequently,
it is not possible to accurately evaluate the reward
when evaluating the batch-test dataset. Earlier research
excludes all the bid requests where the market price is
not known leading to a distributional shift.
3 Problem Definition
We define the MDPM for the optimal bidding strategy
problem (S,A, T ,R, γ) with policy π as follows:
i) We represent the state s ∈ S at time step i as
si = [xi ⊕ wi ⊕ bi ⊕ ti] where xi,bi, ti are the bid
request, budget left, and, time left respectively and ⊕
represents the concatenation operator. wi is the market
price of auction at time step i and observed (might
be censored) at time step i + 1. Thus we use another
notation sOi = [xi ⊕ bi ⊕ ti] to represent the partially
observed state without the market price wi at time i.
The market price wi represent sufficient statistics about
the market (consisting of many DSP) behavior overall.
ii) Action ai ∈ A is the bid price for bid request xi
at time step i. iii) Reward ri = impi or clicki is the
user/market response for bid request xi and bid price
ai; when impression is the utility, reward is 1 if ai > wi
and 0 otherwise. When the utility of interest is click,
besides the impression, the user needs to click the ad for
advertiser to get reward 1. iv) Discount Parameter
γ is usually set as 1 in RTB as the objective is to
maximize total rewards with budget constraints. v)
Policy π(sO = [x ⊕ b ⊕ t], a) is the probability of
bidding a when the bid request, time left, budget left
are x, t, b respectively. vi) We decompose the state
representation into the market-specific state (sMi =
[xi ⊕ wi]) and the advertiser state (sAi = [bi ⊕ ti]).
The transition function is:
T (si, ai, si+1) = P(si+1 = [sMi+1 ⊕ sAi+1] | si, ai).
We denote the batch dataset as a collection of
trajectories D = {τi}ni=1 where trajectory τi =
(s1, a1, r1, s2, a2, r2, · · · , sT , aT , rT ) is the sequence of
state, action, reward in the ith episode. We need to
learn the optimal policy π∗(sO = [xi ⊕ bi ⊕ ti], ·) from
the batch dataset; further we need to devise an evalu-
ation framework that represents the actual test distri-
bution advertiser observes. Moreover, we are interested
in policy π that can generalize to any advertiser state
space (sA = [b⊕ t]).
Remark 1. Before delving into methodology, we state
two important conditional independence properties that
we use throughout our formulation. i) Current market-
specific state and advertiser state are conditionally
independent given the last state and the last action.
Thus the transition function simplifies to:
P(si+1|si, ai) = P(sMi+1|si, ai) · P(sAi+1|si, ai)(3.1)
We can consider the impact of a bidding action taken
by the advertiser is negligible on the decision of future
bid requests generated by large number of users as
well as the bidding behavior of many other DSPs and
advertisers. ii) Market-specific states at any two time
points i 6= j are independent of each other.
P(sMi = si, s
M
j = sj) = P(s
M
i = si)P(s
M
j = sj)(3.2)
We can assume numerous bid requests generated from
many users at different timesteps are independent of
each other.
4 Methodology
In Figure 1(a), we show the graphical model for the
sequence of states (market and advertiser), actions and
rewards. The key idea is that we need to imitate the
behavior of the environment from the batch dataset
to evaluate the correct metric for any policy and to
successfully learn the optimal policy starting with any
advertiser state (sA = [b⊕ t]).
The two conditional independence in Remark 1 im-
plies that the next state of the advertiser depends on the
past state, and, action while the market-specific states
are mutually independent at any two timesteps. Thus,
for the agent to explore in a simulated environment, we
only need the behavior of market-specific state trajec-
tory (sM1 → sM2 · · · → sMn ) and the reward distribution
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Figure 1: a) Graphical model of the Bidding System (left). b) Training and Evaluation Framework (right). Agent
optimized using train environment is tested on test environment.
pr(r; a, s
M ). Using these models, the agent can instan-
tiate with any starting budget b and time constraints
t (that constitutes advertiser state) in the environment
and explore to learn the optimal bidding strategy that
can generalize to unknown advertiser state space. Fur-
ther, we can evaluate any bidding strategy under any
advertiser state space if we have access to the model
that can imitate the market behavior and reward dis-
tributions. Thus the problem reduces to learning a
market model that can sample close to the distribution
used to generate the batch dataset. In Figure 1(b), we
show a schematic diagram of the training and testing
frameworks that exploits the conditional structure on
the graphical model to simulate the training and test-
ing environment; details of which follow next. Finally,
we note that the market (users, other bidders) behaves
rationally and maximize their long-term reward; often
the user clicks ads only if it is relevant to them and other
bidders optimize their cost rationally [6]. We explicitly
state this assumption.
Assumption 1. The market optimizes some unknown
cost function and is near-optimal in making decisions.
4.1 Maximum Entropy Market Model In inverse
reinforcement learning (IRL), the task is to learn the la-
tent cost function as well as the optimal policy from
expert’s trajectories [1, 29]. To imitate the behav-
ior of the market, we need to learn the state dy-
namics and reward distribution of the market. The
(near) optimal trajectories from market are {τMi }ni=1
where τMi = (s
M
1 , r1, s
M
2 , r2, · · · , sMT , rT ), sM is the the
market-specific state and ri is the observed reward by
the advertiser. The state consists of bid request xi in
addition to the (censored) market price wi while the
reward ri is the observed ad impression/click.
For simplicity of derivation, we introduce a separate
notation for the maximum entropy market model with a
new MDP MM along with a modified state and action
space. For the market MDP MM , we denote xi as the
new market state and aMi = [wi ⊕ ri] as the market
action. The decomposition follows our intuition that
the market action (market price, click behavior of user)
is (near) optimal. Finally, note that we do not observe
wi, ri always; in case of losing auction only a lower
bound of the market price wi is known which we handle
later using censored regression-based approaches [26].
Under the new notation, we need to model the market
trajectories {τMi }n1 where τMi = (x1, aM1 , · · · ,xT , aMT ).
We formulate the market trajectory distribu-
tion as, Pφ(τ
M ) =
exp(−cφ(τ
M))
Z where cφ(τ
M ) =∑n
i=1 cφ(xi, a
M
i ) is the latent cost function the market
is optimizing with parameter φ, and, Z is the partition
function. This form follows our assumption that mar-
ket is near-optimal as trajectories with lower cost are
exponentially more probable than the trajectories with
higher cost. Further, the model prefers all the trajec-
tories with the same latent cost functions, equally; thus
maximizing the entropy of the distribution [29]. We
maximize log-likelihood to optimize φ such that histor-
ical market trajectories have a low-cost value:
ℓ(φ) = Eτ∼MM log Pφ(τ) = Eτ∼MM [−cφ(τ)− logZ]
We further simplify with Eq. 3.2 that (xi, a
M
i ) ⊥
(xj , a
M
j ) (note we decompose the market-specific state
sM into x,w in the market MDP formulation). Thus
a random state-action pair of the market trajectory
will have the same expected values as the whole tra-
jectory. Furthermore, we decompose the cost function
as cφ(x, a
M ) = c1φ(x) + c
2
φ(a
M ;x).
ℓ(φ) = E(x,aM)∼sM log Pφ(x, a
M )
= Ex∼sM log Pφ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market State Obj.
+EaM∼sM |x log Pφ(a
M |x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market Action Obj.
(4.3)
= ℓ1(φ) + ℓ2(φ)
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Market State Model. We start with the first
term ℓ1(φ) for the state x of the MDP MM .
ℓ1(φ) = Ex∼Pr [−c1φ(x)] − logZ1
= Ex∼Pr [−c1φ(x)] − log[Ex∼qθ
exp(−c1φ(x))
qθ(x)
]
where we denote Pr as the true distribution of bid
requests x. Computing partition function Z1 =∫
x exp(−c1φ(x))dx is intractable; thus we compute Z1
with samples from a parameterized distribution qθ with
parameter θ and multiply with importance sampling
weights to get a consistent estimate of Z1. We use a
single Monte-carlo sample to compute the unbiased es-
timate of the partition function Z1. The objective be-
comes:
ℓ1(φ) ≃ Ex∼Pr [−c1φ(x)] − log[
exp(−c1φ(x))
qθ(x)
]x∼qθ
= Ex∼Pr [−c1φ(x)] − [−c1φ(x))]x∼qθ + const
where the constant term depends only on sampler pa-
rameter θ (not φ). However, sampling from any dis-
tribution qθ with importance sampling have a high
variance in the estimate of Z1. The optimal distribu-
tion (with least variance) to sample from is q∗θ(x) ∝
exp(−c1φ(x)). Thus similar to guided cost learning [7],
we optimize qθ as well to make it more likely distribu-
tion under the market cost function φ. The objective
for the sampler qθ is:
L1(θ) = Ex∼qθ [−c1φ(x)]
The market sampler (we call it the generator) samples
from x ∼ qθ to minimize the cost on sampled trajec-
tories while the cost function parameter (we call it the
critic) uses network parameter cφ to maximize the cost
for sampled trajectories and minimize the cost from the
real trajectories. The objective for market state model
has the Wasserstein-1 distance form [4, 12]:
W (Pr, qθ) = sup
||cφ||L≤1
Ex∼Pr [cφ(x)] −Ex∼qθ [cφ(x)]
where the supremum is over all the 1-Lipschitz functions
cφ : X → R. The Wasserstein-1 distance with gradi-
ent penalty mitigates the vanishing gradient problem
observed when minimizing Jensen-Shannon divergence
and empirically performs better [10, 4, 12]. Thus, sim-
ilar to [12], we optimize Wasserstein distance with the
gradient penalty term to learn the market state model :
min
cφ
max
qθ
Ex∼Pr [cφ(x)] −Ex∼qθ [cφ(x)] + λLgp
where Lgp = Exˆ∼Pxˆ [||∇xˆcφ(xˆ)||2 − 1)2 and Pxˆ is the
sampling distribution1. If we parameterize the cost
1tx+ (1− t)x˜ = xˆ ∼ Pxˆ with t ∈ U(0, 1), x ∼ Pr, x˜ ∼ qθ.
function cφ with a binary classifier, we get the standard
generative adversarial network resulting in generative
adversarial imitation learning [10, 13].
Sampling State. The market state x or the bid
request is multi-categorical (or binary) in nature. The
generator (market sampler qθ) maps random vectors
z ∈ Rz (often multivariate standard Gaussian) to
generated inputs as xˆ = G(z, θ). We represent the
function as G : (Rz, θ)→ Rd1{0,1}×· · ·×RdF{0,1} where F is
the number of categorical random variables and di is the
number categories for ith categorical random variable.
However, due to discrete nature of the output variables,
we can not use re-parameterization trick to sample from
G(z, θ) [15]. Thus, we resort to Gumbel-softmax trick
to obtain sample from the distribution while allowing
the flow of gradient through the neural network [14].
We represent bid request as x = [x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xF ]
where xi is the one hot encoding of ith categorical
random variable with probability distribution πi. Using
Gumbel-Max trick, we can sample from the distribution
πi as xi = onehot(argmaxj [gj + log π
i
j ]) where gj is
sample from standard Gumbel distribution. As the
argmax operator is not differentiable, we use soft-max
to sample from the distribution πi while allowing to
compute gradient. Thus, xij ≃ exp((gj+log pi
i
j)/τ)∑
k
exp((gk+log piik)/τ)
where τ is the temperature parameter with τ → 0
representing argmax. During training we keep τ > 0
to allow flow of gradient similar to [14].
Market Action Model. Maximization of the 2nd
term in Eq. 4.3, ℓ2 = EaM∼sM |x log P(a
M |x), denotes
maximizing log-likelihood of market action given a bid
request. Note, the market actions are a tuple of market
price and the reward value aM = (wi, ri). We solve
when the utility ri is clicki. The market price and a
click from the user (when ad is shown) are independent
of each other; thus we can write ℓ2 = E log(P(w|x)) +
E log(P(click|x)). Note when ri = impi, we need to
only solve ℓ2 = E log(P(w|x)) as impi is a deterministic
function of market price wi and bid value ai.
For the first term E log P(w|x), we know the market
price when the advertiser wins the auction (W) but
only have lower bound when the advertiser loses (L).
Thus we use fully parametric censored regression to
estimate the market price distribution parameterized
as N (f1(x), exp(f2(x))2) where f1, f2 are deep neural
networks [26, 9]. The objective is to maximize:
∑
log P(w|x) =
∑
L
log P(w ≥ bid|x) +
∑
W
log P(w|x)
The second term, E log(P(click|x)), is always ob-
served when the user sees the ad impression.
Thus, we maximize the binary classification problem,
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E log(P(click|x)), using logistic regression on observed
samples.
4.2 Batch Policy Learning and Evaluation
Framework The maximum entropy market model
equips us with samples from the market state model
qθ(x) and market action model pw(w;x) pr(r;w,x, a).
With any starting advertiser state sA0 = [b0 ⊕ t0], the
agent can simulate the next advertiser state sA1 by sam-
pling the market state x0 ∼ qθ and the market price
w0 from the action model using 1
st conditional inde-
pendence in Eq. 3.1. The current market state xi and
price wi allow updating the next advertiser state s
A
i+1
while market state distribution qθ allows sampling of
the next market state xi+1. The simulated training en-
vironment enables us to run any model-free RL algo-
rithms to learn the optimal bidding strategy. Further,
as the environment allows us to explore, we can start
with any budget and time constraints for the adver-
tiser to improve generalization beyond states observed
in past experiences. In Algorithm 1, we outline the
generic approach for training RL algorithms using the
market state and the action model. Moreover using the
market simulated (testing) environment, we can evalu-
ate any model under any budget and time constraints.
Similar to the training framework, the advertiser can
start with any arbitrary state while allowing to evalu-
ate any bidding strategy using the market model. We
outline the evaluation framework in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Generic Approach for Optimal Bidding
1: Input Market state model x ∼ qtrainθ (x), market action
model w ∼ ptrainw (w;x), r ∼ p
train
r (r;w,x,a)
2: Input Advertiser state sD = [b⊕ t]
3: Input RL Agent/Strategy with a random Policy
4: while agent does not converge do
5: Sample market state x ∼ qtrainθ (x), market price
w ∼ ptrainw (w;x)
6: Agent bids a for observed state sO = [x⊕ sD]
7: Agent observes reward r ∼ ptrainr (r;w,x,a)
8: Update Advertiser state ([b⊕ t]), Policy
9: end while
10: return Policy
We use the Dueling Double Deep Q-network
(DDQN) to train our agent [24, 23] where we use a cur-
rent ψ network to train, a target ψ− network to compute
the target value function and a memory replay bufferM
to sample from old experience. We optimize:
(4.4)
E
(s,a,r,s′)∼M
[(r+γQψ−(s
′, argmax
a′
Qψ(s
′, a′))−Qψ(s, a))2]
Q function in DDQN is estimated using two separate
Algorithm 2 Evaluation Framework
1: Input Market state model x ∼ qtestθ (x), market action
model w ∼ ptestw (w;x), r ∼ p
test
r (r;w,x,a)
2: Input Advertiser state sD = [b⊕ t]
3: Input Agent/Strategy to evaluate
4: Initialize Total Reward to 0
5: while episode did not end do
6: Sample market state x ∼ qtestθ (x), market price
w ∼ ptestw (w;x)
7: Agent bids a for observed state sO = [x⊕ sD]
8: Agent observes reward r ∼ ptestr (r;w,x,a)
9: Update Advertiser state ([b⊕ t]), Total Reward
10: end while
11: return Total Reward
Adv n× 105 d imptr impte cpmtr cpmte KL(Pˆtr||Pˆte)
1458 147 2140 0.172 0.302 11.9 20.7 0.057
2259 14 1097 0.65 0.412 56.8 40.6 0.141
2261 12 992 0.602 0.349 52.1 30.0 0.179
2821 29 1919 0.548 0.166 47.5 16.5 0.46
2997 7 428 0.359 0.301 21.4 19.0 0.012
3358 37 1875 0.604 0.405 55.6 39.4 0.171
3386 140 2054 0.168 0.276 12.5 22.0 0.049
3427 140 3970 0.126 0.442 10.1 35.9 0.242
3476 67 1662 0.257 0.419 20.7 31.9 0.078
Table 1: Dataset statistics for iPinYou Advertisers.
branch of the neural network as Q(s, a) = V (s) +
(A(s, a)− 1|A|
∑
aA(s, a)) where the advantage function
is defined as, Api(s, a) = Qpi(s, a)−V pi(s). We quantize
the one-dimensional continuous bidding values (actions)
and use a discrete action space RL algorithm, DDQN for
improved stability reason on long trajectories [19, 24].
Remark 2. Computational latency is important in
real-time bidding system. The final policy π∗ takes
bid request x, budget left b, and, time left t as input
and computes the optimal bid price a using neural
network ψ in Eq. 4.4. The latency depends on the
neural architecture; we use a simple three hidden layer
neural network. One can easily augment the policy with
a memory state to encode the past using a recurrent
neural network. However, in such cases, the bidding
platform needs to store memory state for each advertiser
in addition to budget and time constraints.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We use two real-world datasets to con-
duct our experiments. Publicly available iPinYou
dataset contains bidding data from 9 advertisers over
multiple days [28]. Bid requests contain multiple cat-
egorical features such as city, domain, etc. Table 1
lists total number of bid requests (n × 105), categor-
ical features (d), average train and test impression
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Figure 2: Average Rewards (Impressions) under varied budget settings on iPinYou Advertisers and Adobe Dataset.
Standard deviation (std) is on the order of 10−1.
(imptr, impte), training and testing cost per thousands
bid requests (cpmtr, cpmte), and, the KL divergence
between train and test empirical market price distribu-
tion (where a higher number implies market price dis-
tribution in train and test datasets are more different).
We learn the optimal bidding strategy from the per-
spective of each advertiser on the iPinYou dataset. For
experimental purposes, we also collect a fraction of bid
requests from a week’s data from Adobe, one of the
leading DSP. The bid requests contain categorical fea-
tures similar to iPinYou. We learn an aggregate optimal
bidding strategy for the Adobe DSP without splitting
the advertisers. The total number of bid requests and
categorical features are 2, 323, 226 and 1282 respectively.
Baseline Methods We compare the following
methods using the same testing environment with var-
ied budget constraints.
LinBid [20] is the linear bidding strategy with
bid = b0θ(x) where b0 is the base parameter tuned on
the training dataset to maximize total rewards.
RLB-Segmentation [5] is the state-of-the-art
model that solves the Bellman equation using model
approximation. Further, RLB uses coarse to fine seg-
mentation to handle large sequences.
FDQI [21] is a generic method for batch RL using
neural fitted deep Q-iteration. Although early works in
real-time bidding systems do not use FDQI, we add this
general batch RL method as a baseline.
Ex-DDQN is our proposed approach based on the
market environment for exploration. We learn the train-
ing market environment using the maximum entropy
principle. We train model-free dueling Q-network with
varied budget constraints using the learned training en-
vironment.
Training and Testing Environment. For each
advertiser in the iPinYou dataset, we use the
60%, 15%, 25% of the days’ samples as the train-
ing, validation and testing data respectively. For the
Adobe dataset, instead of days, we randomly split the
samples as the training, validation, and testing batch
dataset with the same fraction. For evaluation, we learn
the simulated market environment using only the test
datasets. In particular, we learn market state model,
impression and click models from test datasets (we use
validation datasets to do early stopping). For training,
all algorithms use training datasets. For exploration
during training, Ex-DDQN uses the simulated market
environment learned using training datasets.
We learn the market state model using the Wasser-
stein Generative Adversarial Network with gradient
penalty (WGAN-GP) [12]. To learn the impression
model, we maximize fully parametric censored regres-
sion [9]. We learn the click model using logistic regres-
sion. The impression and click model allows us to sam-
ple market price and user click behavior respectively.
To generate a bid request, we sample from a standard
normal distribution as the input to the generator of
the WGAN-GP. We learn these three models to sim-
ulate the market environment from the train and test
datasets (for training and evaluation purposes respec-
tively). Note, in no cases, learning training and the
testing environment share any samples. Network archi-
tecture, featurization, hyper-parameters used for tuning
can be found in the long version of this paper.
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Advertiser Test Sample Model Sample Uniform Sample
1458 0.138± 0.013 0.253± 0.028 2.622± 0.123
2259 0.142± 0.016 0.182± 0.021 2.668± 0.118
2261 0.141± 0.013 0.166± 0.017 2.408± 0.079
2821 0.143± 0.015 0.184± 0.026 2.857± 0.098
2997 0.145± 0.019 0.15± 0.019 4.57± 0.187
3358 0.141± 0.014 0.339± 0.049 2.097± 0.065
3386 0.141± 0.013 0.228± 0.039 2.732± 0.128
3427 0.144± 0.013 0.2± 0.022 2.158± 0.108
3476 0.143± 0.014 0.172± 0.015 1.99± 0.108
Adobe 0.143± 0.013 0.156± 0.015 1.558± 0.063
Table 2:
√
n × ˆMMD Distance between Test samples
and {Test, Model, Uniform} samples. n = 200.
Evaluation Metric We consider the number of
total impressions, over the trajectories, as the utility of
interest. Thus, given a budget and time constraint, the
goal is to maximize the number of impressions for the
advertiser. Note, previous research often considers click
as the utility removing all non-impressed bid requests
[5]. However, for a click to occur, the advertiser needs
to win the auction first. Our framework allows both
click and impression as the utility measure. However,
as clicks are sparse (∼ 0.1%), we choose to tabulate
results with impressions as the utility measure to reduce
variance in the estimation. Further, we consider a
more realistic large scale evaluation where we optimize
bidding strategy for a sequence of T0 = 100, 000 bid
requests, which correspond to real-world 10 minutes
auction volume in case of iPinYou [5, 28].
To evaluate generalization properties of any bidding
strategy, we set budget as B0 = α × cpmte × T0103
where cpmte is the average cost of the advertiser
on the test dataset over 1000 bid requests. We set
α = { 14 , 12 , 1, 2, 4} as the budget constraint. Previous
research only considers α = { 132 , 116 , 18 , 14 , 12}, and,
set test datasets where only the advertisers win the
impression. However, this setting is very unrealistic
in real-world scenarios; besides the test distribution
shift, previous works consider cases where the budget
is strictly less than the spent [5]. In our evaluation,
we do not directly use the test dataset; instead, we
learn a test market sampler and use samples from the
sampler to test all model fairly. For all budget settings,
we repeat the experiment 10 times to get the average
and the standard deviation (std) numbers.
5.2 Results In Figure 2, we plot the percent-
age of impressions won over the trajectories (100, 000
timesteps) for all advertisers on the iPinYou dataset as
well as on the Adobe dataset with different budget con-
straints.
On the lowest budget settings (budget = α ×
cpmte × T0103 ) with α = 14 , all batch RL methods, RLB,
LinBid, FDQI have experiences from the historical in-
teractions; thus we expect relatively better performance
from these algorithms. For all advertisers, except for ad-
vertiser 2997, Ex-DDQN consistently performs similar
or better than RLB/LinBid methods while significantly
improving on the FDQI method. Performances of RLB
and Linbid are mixed with cases one works better than
the other and vice-versa. For budget setting α = 12 , Ex-
DDQN performs significantly better than all algorithms
on nine of the ten cases. The average gain over the next
best performance on the nine advertisers is more than
7%. While FDQI does not perform well, the other two
batch algorithms, LinBid, and, RLB perform relatively
well with a few cases improving upon Ex-DDQN. The
result suggests Ex-DDQN performs similar (and some-
times better) to the state-of-the-art method when bud-
get settings are small (α ≤ 1/2).
For budget settings α ≥ 1, we compare the gener-
alization performance of the batch RL algorithms. In-
terestingly in all cases, Ex-DDQN significantly (some-
times with margin ≥ 10%− 30%) improves LinBid and
RLB algorithms while FDQI follows Ex-DDQN per-
formance. The significant performance gain suggests
agents trained to explore with varied advertiser states
on the simulated training environment can potentially
generalize on the new test environment (even where
train and test datasets are significantly different, see
Table 1).
We further note that RLB performs relatively bet-
ter when α ≤ 1/2 and KL divergence (listed in Ta-
ble 1) between empirical train and test market price is
small. RLB being a model-based RL algorithm solves
Bellman equation with empirical training market price;
thus making them sensitive to model mismatch error.
For example, on advertiser 2821 and 3427 (where KL
divergences are particularly high), RLB performs sig-
nificantly worse than even the LinBid algorithm. Both
RLB and Linbid have saturating behavior when budget
parameter α is more than 1. The saturating behavior
suggests that these batch models face difficulty extrapo-
lating optimal behavior with higher budget constraints.
5.3 Market Model Evaluation We evaluate our
testing environment to compare whether the generated
model bid requests reflect the true samples from the
test distribution. We sample n = 200 bid requests from
test batch dataset and sample another 200 bid requests
each from test batch dataset, maximum entropy mar-
ket model and uniformly randomly from the categorical
features to compute empirical Maximum Mean Discrep-
ancy (MMD) distance [11]. In Table 2, we list the av-
erage empirical MMD distance and standard deviation
from repeating the process 100 times. We use Gaussian
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kernel with σ = 1. Empirical MMD distance is close to
zero for samples between test batch datasets and sam-
ples from the market model while for a uniformly ran-
dom sample, distance is an order of magnitude larger.
This result validates our testing environment learned
using the maximum entropy principle being close to the
actual one in real-traffic.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we tackle one of the key challenges in the
real-time bidding system, learning the optimal bidding
strategy from a batch dataset. We propose a generic
framework for evaluating models from batch datasets
which were lacking in previous literature. Further, we
propose a solution to learn the optimal strategy from
the batch dataset that has the property to generalize
to unseen state space in addition to competitive (some-
times better) performance on the known regime. Al-
though we analyze only on RTB systems, learning from
the batch dataset poses a significant challenge to any
recommender system-based solutions. Without inter-
acting with the user (or market) in real-traffic, evalua-
tion/training becomes difficult. Potentially our frame-
work can be applied in recommender systems where
state and transition function decomposes similar to
RTB systems; such extensions we leave for future work.
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7 Featurization
The public dataset iPinYou has bid, impression, click,
and conversion logs. We did a join with bid logs and
impression logs to compute the market price (in case of
winning auctions). iPinYou data is grouped into two
subsets: session 2 (dates from 2013-06-06 to 2013-06-
12), and session 3 (2013-10-19 to 2013-10-27). We di-
vide the whole dataset among the 9 advertisers as done
in previous research [5]. We use the following fields:
Timestamp, UserAgent, Region, City, AdExchange,
Domain, AdSlotId, SlotWidth, SlotHeight, SlotVisibil-
ity, SlotFormat, Usertag. Every categorical feature
(e.g City), is one-hot encoded, whereas every numeri-
cal feature (e.g Adheight) is categorized into bins and
subsequently represented as one-hot encoded vectors.
This way, each bid request is represented as a large
sparse vector We converted Timestamp into two fea-
tures namely the day of the week and hour of the
day. We converted User-Agent as a combination of
oses (“windows”, “ios”, “mac”, “android”, “linux”)
and browsers (“chrome”, “sogou”, “maxthon”, “safari”,
“firefox”, “theworld”, “opera”, “ie”). For each field,
we use the features (field values such as City: 16) only
which occurs 500 times in the dataset (with respect to
the advertiser). For Adobe dataset, we have similar Cat-
egorical as well as Numerical features. We use the same
procedure with a feature threshold of 1000 to compute
the sparse feature representation.
8 Architecture and Hyper-parameters
8.1 Architecture for Maximum Entropy Mar-
ket State Model The generator (or sampler) for
WGAN-GP has an input size of 64. We sample from
standard normal distribution N (0, I64) as the input
to the generator. We use three hidden layers with
256, 256, 128 nodes respectively. The output layer has
categorical constraints (for each field in the feature vec-
tor). We use the Gumbel-softmax trick with a temper-
ature parameter of τ = 0.667 while training. The critic
has also three hidden layers with 256, 256, 128 nodes re-
spectively. We use a single node in the last layer to
generate the critic scalar output similar to WGAN-GP.
We use ℓ2 regularization with a value of 1e−10. We use
5 critic iteration for each generator steps with λ = 10 as
the gradient penalty [12]. We use a batch size of 1024.
Adv Budget LinBid RLB FDQI Ex-DDQN
1458
1
4 12.99± 0.09 10.22± 0.07 5.64± 0.04 10.92± 0.11
1
2 19.16± 0.14 12.67± 0.07 11.12± 0.09 19.86± 0.1
1 19.1± 0.12 14.68± 0.11 22.12± 0.08 28.24± 0.08
2 19.15± 0.14 14.62± 0.12 32.92± 0.17 35.32± 0.15
4 19.08± 0.11 14.68± 0.12 32.97± 0.08 40.08± 0.1
2259
1
4 18.24± 0.09 17.11± 0.05 8.56± 0.05 16.22± 0.07
1
2 24.75± 0.18 23.74± 0.12 17.34± 0.11 25.15± 0.13
1 24.77± 0.13 33.27± 0.11 34.12± 0.15 36.44± 0.12
2 24.68± 0.08 43.09± 0.13 42.93± 0.09 50.49± 0.12
4 24.76± 0.14 43.29± 0.11 42.54± 0.14 53.2± 0.15
2261
1
4 14.52± 0.14 13.61± 0.1 6.26± 0.05 16.08± 0.08
1
2 19.19± 0.1 18.31± 0.09 12.52± 0.08 19.78± 0.05
1 19.14± 0.13 24.98± 0.12 26.54± 0.09 28.92± 0.09
2 19.27± 0.14 32.69± 0.09 34.17± 0.08 39.8± 0.13
4 19.28± 0.12 35.94± 0.08 35.1± 0.13 46.15± 0.12
2821
1
4 5.89± 0.08 4.31± 0.04 3.47± 0.05 6.58± 0.05
1
2 8.19± 0.06 5.84± 0.1 6.62± 0.05 9.68± 0.02
1 8.18± 0.08 8.4± 0.08 13.21± 0.09 13.6± 0.05
2 8.19± 0.07 11.99± 0.12 14.18± 0.08 19.3± 0.06
4 8.2± 0.06 15.82± 0.11 16.04± 0.07 23.3± 0.14
2997
1
4 10.35± 0.08 11.45± 0.1 7.46± 0.08 3.62± 0.05
1
2 11.34± 0.09 13.48± 0.08 10.26± 0.1 7.79± 0.07
1 11.32± 0.06 16.32± 0.12 17.18± 0.12 21.75± 0.14
2 11.37± 0.09 19.43± 0.09 31.96± 0.12 32.12± 0.1
4 11.33± 0.1 19.58± 0.1 32.46± 0.12 43.98± 0.1
3358
1
4 18.92± 0.08 17.74± 0.09 14.91± 0.04 19.4± 0.06
1
2 27.31± 0.08 24.74± 0.08 23.7± 0.08 28.0± 0.1
1 27.22± 0.09 33.65± 0.14 36.08± 0.14 38.14± 0.1
2 27.19± 0.14 42.57± 0.13 35.2± 0.18 50.8± 0.09
4 27.29± 0.12 43.83± 0.18 36.12± 0.04 64.34± 0.17
3386
1
4 13.0± 0.1 9.42± 0.06 6.78± 0.08 12.74± 0.12
1
2 18.53± 0.1 11.8± 0.07 13.37± 0.08 18.96± 0.13
1 20.66± 0.09 14.02± 0.07 24.15± 0.1 26.38± 0.12
2 20.68± 0.1 14.1± 0.13 29.02± 0.09 32.97± 0.09
4 20.61± 0.13 14.2± 0.1 33.64± 0.15 34.72± 0.12
3427
1
4 16.49± 0.11 15.78± 0.12 10.29± 0.05 19.56± 0.11
1
2 22.97± 0.12 18.73± 0.1 20.11± 0.12 30.29± 0.09
1 22.94± 0.12 18.88± 0.09 39.96± 0.07 41.66± 0.08
2 22.89± 0.14 18.89± 0.08 50.8± 0.16 54.94± 0.12
4 22.91± 0.19 18.94± 0.1 69.9± 0.12 68.95± 0.14
3476
1
4 17.27± 0.08 14.9± 0.1 9.32± 0.04 16.82± 0.08
1
2 26.26± 0.07 20.58± 0.13 18.52± 0.1 26.74± 0.05
1 27.47± 0.12 26.1± 0.12 36.46± 0.07 37.8± 0.07
2 27.4± 0.1 27.58± 0.15 41.0± 0.17 48.78± 0.11
4 27.36± 0.12 27.58± 0.17 41.25± 0.18 65.08± 0.11
Table 3: Average rewards (Impression) in % over the
trajectories of iPinYou advertiser
We use default Xavier initialization for the critic and
the generator.
8.2 Hyper-parameter for Maximum Entropy
Market State Model We used learning rate from
{1e− 4, 2e− 4} for Adam optimizer. We run the max-
imum entropy model for both training and test batch
dataset for each advertiser and run till convergence of
the critic. Critic convergence implies the same distri-
bution of the sampler as the true distribution [4, 12].
Although we set maximum iterations to 4000, critic con-
verges within 100-2000 iterations for all advertisers.
8.3 Impression and Click Model Impression
model is a simple linear model with the input connected
to the two-node layer to predict the expected market
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Adv Budget LinBid RLB FDQI Ex-DDQN
Adobe
1
4 0.81± 0.01 3.8± 0.04 1.8± 0.02 3.66± 0.06
1
2 1.61± 0.01 5.03± 0.06 3.47± 0.02 5.24± 0.1
1 3.24± 0.02 6.48± 0.07 5.88± 0.03 7.55± 0.05
2 6.47± 0.03 7.28± 0.06 7.72± 0.03 11.42± 0.07
4 12.89± 0.06 7.31± 0.09 17.61± 0.14 18.18± 0.09
Table 4: Average rewards (Impression) in % over the
trajectories on Adobe Dataset
price and expected log variance of the market price dis-
tribution. We set initial weight parameters to 0 and the
bias parameter to 200 and 10 for mean and log variance
parameter based on the empirical dataset. The click
model is a simple logistic regression initialized from the
standard normal distribution.
8.4 Hyper-parameter for Impression and Click
Model We use ℓ2 regularization from {1e−2, 1e−4, 1e−
6, 1e−8} for both impression and click model to do early
stopping on the validation dataset. We use batchsize of
1024 and run 100 (×number-of-batch) iteration.
8.5 Ex-DDQN Architecture & Hyper-
parameters We use a neural network to learn
the agent. We use the bid request, time constraint and
budget constraint as the input to the Q-network. We
connect the bid request to a single node hidden layer
(f(x) = h1 ∈ R1) such that a large number of features
from bid requests do not overpower the budget and time
constraints. We concatenate the single node hidden
layer with budget and time constraints to compute the
second layer hidden nodes as h2 = [f1(x)⊕b⊕ t] which
passes through the remaining neural network. We use
one shared layer of dimension 128 and followed by two
separate networks to compute the value function and
advantage function. The value function network has
two-layer with 64 and 1 hidden nodes. The advantage
function network has similarly a layer with a 64 node
followed by 20 nodes. We quantize the bid values into
20 same length intervals to represent the action space.
For the first step f1, we initialize the network with the
impression model weight parameters. We initialize the
rest of the neural network using Xavier’s initialization.
We use ǫ-greedy with epsilon decay to sample from
the action space. We use the following formula at time
step t; ǫ = 0.2 + (1− 0.2) exp(−t/500, 000). We use the
memory buffer with a maximum length of 2, 500, 000.
We copy the target parameter every 5000 time steps and
start optimizing from time step 2000. We run 5 million
steps with 16 workers synchronously for interacting
with the environment. We set the starting budget as
α× cpmtrain× 10−3× timesteps where α was randomly
drawn from U(−2, 2), U being the uniform distribution.
The starting time constraint is always set to 100, 000.
We use learning rate parameters from {1e − 3, 2e − 4}
for hyper-parameter tuning.
8.6 FDQI Architecture & Hyper-parameters
For iPinYou, the batch dataset does not have a state
(such as budget and time constraints) associated with
the advertiser. We divide the batch dataset into
multiple sequences of 100, 000 consecutive steps. We
set the initial time constraint as t = 100, 000e and set
the initial budget constraint as the cost to be incurred
by the advertiser b =
∑100000
i=1 costi . We use the
same architecture as Ex-DDQN for the value function
estimator in Fitted Deep Q-Network. We do not have
any memory buffer restriction; we use all the batch
training interactions in the memory buffer. Similar to
Ex-DDQN, we use the learning rate parameter from
{1e − 3, 2e − 4} to pick the best agent from the batch
datasets.
8.7 Test Procedure in Simulated Environment
We use the train batch dataset to learn the train market
state model and the impression model. We use these two
models to learn our Ex-DDQN agent. For all models, we
use the same testing simulated environments for which
we use the test batch dataset to learn the test market
state model and the test impression model. These two
models allow us to sample bid requests, and the market
price distribution, necessary to evaluate any bidding
algorithm. In no cases, the testing environment and the
training environment share any samples to learn from.
We divided train, test, validation split based on days
which results in significant co-variates shift.
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